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ABSTRACT
The concept of city or urban resilience has emerged as
one of the key challenges for the next decades. As a con-
sequence, institutions like the United Nations or Rock-
efeller Foundation have embraced initiatives that in-
crease or improve it. These efforts translate into funded
programs both for action“on the ground”and to develop
quantification of resilience, under the for of an index.
Ironically, on the academic side there is no clear con-
sensus regarding how resilience should be quantified, or
what it exactly refers to in the urban context. Here we
attempt to link both extremes providing an example
of how to exploit large, publicly available, worldwide
urban datasets, to produce objective insight into one
of the possible dimensions of urban resilience. We do
so via well-established methods in complexity science,
such as percolation theory –which has a long tradition
at providing valuable information on the vulnerability
in complex systems. Our findings uncover large differ-
ences among studied cities, both regarding their infras-
tructural fragility and the imbalances in the distribution
of critical services.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Over the past years the concept of urban or city
resilience has repeatedly appeared in many contexts.
While there is a general agreement that it is related
to the capacity of a urban area to confront uncertainty
and/or risk, it is not clear how it should be operational-
ized or quantified. Meerow et al. [12] identify as many
as 25 different definitions of urban resilience in the liter-
ature, related more or less strictly to Engineering, En-
vironmental Sciences, Business and Finance, or Social
Sciences. Indeed, it seems common sense that “generic
resilience” (capacity of a system to recover its initial
state after a shock) can be mapped onto a myriad of
particular definitions which differ only in the number
of affected subsystems (infrastructural, social, ecologi-
cal) and the time scale of the disturbance itself: a shock
may arrive under the form of a natural disaster (fast,
system-wide), an economic crisis (slow, specific) or the
long-term urban footprint on the surrounding environ-
ment (very slow and hardly visible in the city itself).
These semantic difficulties go well beyond pure
academia, and can affect actual efforts towards increas-
ing urban resilience. Public and private institutions,
like the United Nations or the Rockefeller Foundation,
are currently supporting initiatives which focus, explic-
itly or implicitly, on this topic. If, however, its defi-
nition is unclear, these programs encounter difficulties
at making decisions –whether a given investment makes
sense or not. In this direction, the “100 Resilient Cities
Program” (100RC) at the Rockefeller Foundation has
recently released some guidelines with regard to what
makes a city resilient (City Resilience Index, CRI)1.
This effort to build an agreed rationale is interesting,
because it breaks down the problem into four dimen-
sions (see Figure 1), which is already a significant ad-
1See http://www.cityresilienceindex.org/
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Figure 1: Guidelines to the CRI. Resilience is
mapped onto 4 key dimensions (outmost ring),
which are in turn subdivided into 12 specific
goals.
vance toward operationalization.
In this paper we focus on the infrastructural side
of the 100RC, which breaks this dimension into three
goals: reliable mobility and communications; reduced
exposure and fragility; and effective provision of critical
services. We relate each of these goals to different as-
pects of network robustness, which has a longstanding
tradition in complex systems, and percolation theory in
particular [1, 5, 7]. Our claim is that the current avail-
ability of large digital datasets, and of solid foundations
in complex networks can offer a suitable quantitative
complement to the evaluation of city resilience, which
–as in the example of CRI– typically relies on general
traits (e.g. exposure of a zone to flooding hazards).
Our study relates the first aforementioned goal with
the robustness of the road network against random fail-
ure of its segments, inasmuch “reliable mobility” re-
lates to daily connectivity between places, people and
services. In this sense, the network is prone to fail
anywhere, anytime (accidents, congestion, system-wide
shocks), as opposed to targeted attacks on critical parts
of the infrastructure which is the second goal (“reduced
exposure and fragility”). Finally, we combine this net-
work approach with large datasets on service location
extracted from Foursquare 2 – a location-based social
network (LBSN) – to understand to what extent a bro-
ken infrastructure can affect the reachability of critical
services (“effective provision of critical services”), i.e.
whether a city offers a balanced and redundant supply
of resources. Such services include but are not limited
to “medical center” and “transportation infrastructure”.
In order to place the paper in the right context, we
2https://foursquare.com/
Figure 2: The geography of cities covered in this
study. As we see, cities are from around the
world and span six continents.
have chosen to perform this work mostly on cities in-
cluded in 100RC for which we could collected data, of-
fering a study at scale which allows for a cross-city ro-
bustness comparison that has –to the best of our knowledge–
not been addressed before.
2. DATA
To conduct our study, we focus on cities participating
in the 100RC program to which we deliberately added 5
cities from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in the
Middle East. These cities are Abu-Dhabi and Dubai
(UAE), Doha (Qatar), Manama (Bahrain), and Riyadh
(Saudi Arabia). Figure 2 gives an overview of the ge-
ographical distribution of the 54 cities considered. We
can easily see that the cities span all continents (ex-
cept Antarctic) with 4 cities from Africa, 14 from Asia,
10 from Europe, 14 from North America, 6 from South
America, 1 from Central America, and 4 from Oceania.
The geographic diversity and cultural heterogeneity of
these cities provide two advantages. First, it dimin-
ishes the biases one could observe in studies that focus
on cities from a particular country or continent. Fur-
thermore, it allows a more robust generalization of the
findings.
For each city, we requested two types of data: the
road network and the geographic distribution of differ-
ent services available in the city. We describe in the
following section the data used and the processes by
which it was prepared. We also report some initial ob-
servations.
2.1 From Open Street Map to Road Net-
works
OpenStreetMap (OSM) 3 is a popular open source
mapping service built by a community of volunteer map-
pers who contribute to the tagging of cities by maintain-
ing data about buildings, shops, roads, metro stations
and any other service that has a value to be on a map.
As a crowd-sourced platform, OSM relies on its active
3http://www.openstreetmap.org
community of contributers to create accurate maps by
leveraging their local knowledge on neighborhoods. Be-
cause OSM databases are exclusively contributed by
volunteers, it is important to understand that its ac-
curacy and completeness vary from a city to another.
Generally speaking, large touristic cities like Paris, New
York, and Singapore tend to expose data with high res-
olution and quality as compared to smaller and isolated
cities.
While OSM provides reasonable APIs to query its
databases, we decided to use a more comprehensive on-
line service called Mapzen4 to download “extracts” of
relevant cities. The extracts we requested come in the
form of shape files that are easy to process. Mapzen
updates on a daily basis its city extracts by querying
OSM.
2.2 Creating road networks
The shape file of cities come with different files defin-
ing different services in the city such as transport points,
building, places, administrative boundaries, and roads.
All these objects are made in OSM with nodes. A node
is defined with two mandatory attributes that are its
ID (unique identifier) and its GPS coordinates (longi-
tude, latitude), and a list of complementary information
such as names, addresses, and types of locations. Com-
plex objects such as buildings are defined as polygons
of nodes whereas paths (segments of roads) are defined
as lists of nodes.
Given the road shape file (i.e., list of paths) of a city,
our objective is to create a real road network in which
nodes are intersections and edges are road segments be-
tween them. The major challenge in this task is to
know how to merge different paths (streets) into the
same transportation unit (road). Different techniques
have been proposed in the literature to deal with this
problem. Some of them rely on the street names (SN)
to group them [9] whereas other methods are based on
the geometry of streets and look at the intersection con-
tinuity between streets (ICN) [13]. Given that both ap-
proaches have pros and cons, we decided to go with our
own three-steps heuristic (see Figure 3 for an illustrative
example.)
Step 1. We identify the list of relevant nodes. A
node is considered relevant to the road network if and
only if it verifies one of the following two conditions:
(i.) The node is the beginning or the end of a path.
(ii.) The node belongs to more than one path. The
first condition captures all nodes necessary to the def-
inition of roads whereas the second condition captures
intersections between roads.
Step 2. We iteratively scan through the list of all
paths available in the city shape file. For each path, we
create an edge between every successive pair of relevant
nodes identified in step one. This process discards in-
termediate nodes that OSM mappers use primarily to
4http://mapzen.com
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Figure 3: Building road network from OSM
paths. Given three roads, we first identify the
set of relevant nodes. Nodes number 1, 3, 4,
6, 7 and 9 are relevant because they start/end
roads. Nodes 4 and 6 are also intersections as
both belong to more than one path. But node 4
is removed in the third step at it holds a degree
k = 2.
(a) New York (b) London
(c) Dakar (d) Dubai
Figure 4: Road networks of some selected cities
as extracted from OpenStreetMap. We see that
cities show different types of networks in terms
of size, density, and topology
shape road segments.
Step 3. We recursively prune from the resulting
graph all nodes with degree k = 2 and replace them
with an edge connecting the two nodes to which they
are linked. The intuition here is that nodes with degree
k = 2 do not add any semantic to the road network as
it is envisioned in this study.
Examples of real road networks of four cities gener-
ated with our heuristic are shown in Figure 4.
In Table 1 we summarize some key structural traits
of the extracted road networks. For consistency reason,
we reduce the road network of each city to its first gi-
ant connected component (GCC) for which we highlight
V (city) (number of nodes), E(city) (number of edges),
Length (total kilometers), average degree (k). We in-
clude also Meshness M ∈ [0, 1], defined as the ratio of
the existing facets divided by the total number of all
possible facets in a graph, where M ∼ 0 (for tree-like
graphs) and M ∼ 1 (for complete graphs) [14]:
M = (E − V + 1)/(2V − 5) (1)
Finally, we report the“organic”score to assess whether a
road network has been planned or not [14], computed as
the proportion of dead ends (nodes with degree k = 1)
and unfinished intersections (nodes with degree k = 3)
to the total number of nodes:
Org = (V (k = 1) + V (k = 3))/V (2)
We found that the meshness scores of cities in this
study vary between 0.084 for San-Juan and 0.228 for
Riyadh which are consistent with the scores reported
in [6] on analyzing planar graphs of twenty cities. The
low scores are mainly due to the absence of squares and
triangles in real-world cities. Non surprisingly, organic
scores are high for almost all the cities, with a noticeable
advantage for new and fast growing cities such as Accra
(0.97) and Doha (0.96) as compared to old cities such
as Barcelona and San-Francisco (0.89).
2.3 Service location data
Foursquare is a location-based social media network
that allows users to share their location with friends
through what is known as check-in. Data from such
check-ins contain information about the user, the venue
she is reporting on, the specific location of that venue
(coordinates) and a timestamp.
In this work we exploit data that were collected by
Yang et al. [15, 16] from April 2012 to September 2013.
This rich dataset contains 33,278,683 check-ins posted
by 266,909 users on 3,680,126 unique venues, that are
geographically spread in 415 cities across 77 countries.
For our purposes, we only pay attention to the type of
service the venue belongs to according to the Foursquare
category hierarchy5; and its GPS position –disregarding
any other information. We have deliberately promoted
the “Medical Centers” sub-category into a parent cat-
egory to be able to assess how such a critical service
is affected by failures in the city. At the end we ob-
tained a list of 10 different categories of different criti-
cality, including: Medical Center, Travel & Transport,
Food, College & University, Residence, Arts & Enter-
tainment, Shops & service, Nightlife Spot, Professional
& Other Places, and Outdoors & Recreation.
To integrate the network structure with services loca-
tions, we assign each location to its closest node. This is
tantamount to mapping service locations to their near-
est intersection, allowing an efficient computation of the
amount of reachable services (see Section 3). Services
that are farther than 2 km for all intersections in a city
are omitted from the study.
3. METHODS
5https://developer.foursquare.com/categorytree
Table 1: Statistics about road networks of dif-
ferent cities.
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City ||V|| ||E|| Length (KM) K Mesh Org
los-angeles 525246 678652 113504.437 2.584 0.146 0.924
paris 369244 503320 54713.641 2.726 0.182 0.915
london 343081 451855 37954.920 2.634 0.159 0.900
dallas 313147 398649 80613.803 2.546 0.137 0.950
chicago 300479 403366 70911.445 2.685 0.171 0.938
melbourne 285671 382855 48425.705 2.680 0.170 0.936
new-york 280797 378542 60445.977 2.696 0.174 0.925
denver-boulder 224441 296232 44696.132 2.640 0.160 0.920
bangkok 205062 251387 64109.417 2.452 0.113 0.966
rotterdam 197785 280381 24081.916 2.835 0.209 0.867
mexico-city 184568 246154 36659.346 2.667 0.167 0.944
milan 177746 242894 22686.829 2.733 0.183 0.911
pittsburgh 169723 211419 42600.967 2.491 0.123 0.950
saint-louis 167058 203376 44989.002 2.435 0.109 0.953
rio-de-janeiro 145383 193222 28436.101 2.658 0.165 0.943
lisbon 136740 184803 24091.563 2.703 0.176 0.944
athens 136338 188655 25389.023 2.767 0.192 0.907
sydney 131581 174639 22508.013 2.654 0.164 0.948
montreal 124373 172043 39126.493 2.767 0.192 0.908
rome 111259 147794 17878.176 2.657 0.164 0.920
riyadh 107445 156448 24023.621 2.912 0.228 0.980
santiago 107027 146604 17690.681 2.740 0.185 0.946
san-francisco 99491 134451 17644.981 2.703 0.176 0.898
glasgow 93235 118877 11350.264 2.550 0.138 0.953
bengaluru 88037 114748 14457.036 2.607 0.152 0.959
porto-alegre 79148 108282 23416.511 2.736 0.184 0.918
new-orleans 76438 94395 22442.663 2.470 0.117 0.948
chennai 72277 92720 11950.411 2.566 0.141 0.958
singapore 65333 87039 13641.570 2.664 0.166 0.931
dubai 64462 92849 12127.150 2.881 0.220 0.907
san-juan 61883 72247 9027.872 2.335 0.084 0.963
barcelona 59165 84178 10104.779 2.846 0.211 0.899
amman 57123 76775 10675.922 2.688 0.172 0.954
el-paso 44326 60167 11000.284 2.715 0.179 0.949
quito 43051 56301 10406.483 2.616 0.154 0.944
durban 42171 53345 8424.425 2.530 0.133 0.942
boston 40375 55573 5656.712 2.753 0.188 0.899
dakar 38640 54164 4208.776 2.804 0.201 0.949
abudhabi 38401 55724 8006.597 2.902 0.226 0.880
doha 34743 48544 7106.840 2.794 0.199 0.968
juarez 33663 46313 7401.811 2.752 0.188 0.949
belgrade 32936 41780 5840.179 2.537 0.134 0.937
wellington 27135 32651 7811.626 2.407 0.102 0.967
manama 26781 37143 3891.066 2.774 0.193 0.957
medellin 24410 33397 5049.379 2.736 0.184 0.902
christchurch 20368 26220 5667.041 2.575 0.144 0.939
cali 20001 28930 3549.279 2.893 0.223 0.923
accra 19838 26079 4070.770 2.629 0.157 0.974
phnom-penh 17283 22296 4075.526 2.580 0.145 0.959
mandalay 7190 9584 1706.192 2.666 0.167 0.944
da-nang 6872 9777 1565.853 2.845 0.212 0.930
kigali 6622 9006 2511.172 2.720 0.180 0.945
surat 2639 3569 1040.696 2.705 0.177 0.958
Network percolation theory has already been exploited
in the urban context for other purposes than the ones in
this work [2, 10, 14]. With the road networks for dozens
of cities at hand, we can now proceed with the percola-
tion dynamics in two different ways. Both of them share
the idea of progressive structural deterioration [1, 5, 7],
understood either as error or failure (removal of ran-
domly chosen edges); or attack (removal of important
edges, where “importance” can be quantified by some
descriptor, such as high betweenness of edges, high cen-
trality of nodes, etc.) Note that in this work we focus
on bond percolation (edges are removed) as opposed to
site percolation (nodes are removed).
Here we apply both Error and Attack procedures on
the available networks. For the Error process, at each
step an edge chosen uniformly at random is removed,
until the size of the GCC (giant connected component)
is equal to the size of the SLCC (second larger con-
nected component). Connected components (and their
sizes) are checked periodically (each time 1% of edges
have been deleted). Because of the stochastic nature
of this process, it is repeated 50 times so as to report
the average expected deterioration of the network. In
the Attack modality, the edge with highest between-
ness centrality is removed at each step. As before, the
process continues until the size of the GCC is equal to
the size of the SLCC.
Following these progressive schemes, as the fraction
p of removed edges increases the size of the GCC (cap-
tured in number of nodes) decreases, until the network
undergoes a second-order phase transition at the criti-
cal point pc (percolation threshold). Such transition can
be spotted precisely –it occurs when the size of SLCC
becomes maximal [3].
For each network, at pc we compute the proportion
of available services (gathered under ten general cate-
gories) in the remaining GCC as a proxy of the capacity
of a city to deliver those services in an Error/Attack
scenario.
4. RESULTS
We first take a look at the cities’ response to Error.
Figure 5 shows some examples of how random edge re-
moval affects the size of the GCC. Typically, the size of
the GCC is relatively stable, which indicates that the
road structure is not suffering a large damage regarding
overall reachability. At a given point (pc), a transition
takes place (often quite abruptly, e.g. Dakar or Abu-
Dhabi), after which the network is shattered into many
disconnected components. Note that Error results are
only reported for a subset of cities to ease the compar-
ison across different experiments.
Along this process, pc can be seen as an indicator of
the robustness of the system to failure. A low criti-
cal threshold can be interpreted as a limited capacity of
the road infrastructure to support and recover from ran-
dom disruption –accidents or congestion happening at
any location, or system-wide disturbance. In Figure 7
(left), cities are sorted according to their pc against ran-
dom error (averaged over 50 realizations). We see there
that there is a remarkably wide range of cities, with
the weakest road network corresponding to Wellington
(pc = 0.17), and the more robust ones to Mandalay,
Cali and Boston (pc = 0.35). Such variability suggests
deep structural differences beyond the obvious features
reported in Table 1 (compare for instance the two men-
tioned cities). We also see that most North American
have made it to the top cities in terms of robustness to
random error.
Figure 6 shows as well the progressive deterioration
of the GCC as a function of the fraction of removed
edges, but in this case links are targeted with respect
to their betweenness centrality. The differences with
respect to Figure 5 are obvious –transitions take place
much earlier and in a much more abrupt manner. In
this case, the values of pc are below 10% for any city
under study, evidencing the large dependence (and, in
turn, exposure and vulnerability) of the road network
on a few central segments. Figure 7 (right) shows cities
sorted by their percolation threshold under the targeted
Attack scheme.
Interestingly, we see that the ranking of cities has
drastically changed in Attack. In fact, cities from Ocea-
nia such as Wellington and Christchurch are turned to
be among the most robust cities in these scheme while
they were at the bottom of the ranking in the Error
scheme. We also observe that North American cities
are no longer grouped toward the head of the ranking
as they were in the Error case. This suggest that cities,
regardless of their location, behave differently the two
failure schemes considered in our study. We further
computed the overall Pearson correlation between the
vectors of pc scores and we found it as low at 0.23, indi-
cating that there is a very low correlation between the
percolation thresholds observed in Error and Attack
schemes. In other words, a city with a high robustness
to Error can be very vulnerable for Attack and vice
versa.
The third focus of our work is related to the question
of service distribution. The effects of the failure of a
part of the road network are not important per se, but
in terms of the possibility to reach –or not– any other
part of the city (and the services it delivers). Thus, be-
sides questioning how robust the infrastructure is (i.e.
how early it breaks), we wonder now about the con-
sequences of surpassing pc in terms of health, food or
residential resources. Figure 8(b) summarizes the situa-
tion for the 27 cities for which we could find Foursquare
data. In panel (a) of the same figure, we compute for
each city the average proportion of available services
(across the ten categories) reachable by the GCC ob-
served at percolation threshold (pc.) Here again, we
found that North and South American cities such as
New Orleans, New York, Motreal, Quito, and Porto-
Alegre are in the top of the ranking. In the city of New
Orleans for instance, only 23% of the services became
unaccessible (availability around 77%.) The bottom of
the ranking is fairly dominated by European cities with
Rotterdam and London in the bottom 3 cities. Indeed,
a city like Rotterdam could preserve access to only 26%
of all its services. Also, there seem to be a negative cor-
relation between the percolation threshold of a city and
the fraction of services it retains. That is, the higher the
percolation threshold the lower the available services.
In panel (b) of Figure 8 we report the the availabil-
ity of service per city per category. We represent in
red the cities that lost more than 50% of services in
at least on category whereas we use green to report
cities that preserve at least 50% of their services in all
categories. We also plot in black the average avail-
Figure 5: Random failure behavior. Evolution of the size of the GCC (y-axis) as a function of the
percentage of removed edges (x-axis). Results are reported for 50 randomizations. Notably, cities
react differently to edge failure due to their different pc –see Figure 7 (left).
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Figure 6: Intentional attack behavior: Evolution of the size of the GCC as a function of the percentage
of removed edges. Again, cities react differently to edge failure –see Figure 7 (right).
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(b) Targeted attack
Figure 7: Percolation point pc of different cities. The percolation point is computed as fraction of
removed edges from the network when the size of the second larger connected component maximizes.
Figure (a) reports the results for the random failure in which percolation thresholds are between 17%
(Wellington) and 35% (Boston, Cali, and Mandalay). Figure (b) reports the results for the targeted
attack. As expected, the percolation happens now much earlier, after removing only 1% of edges in
New Orleans, or 2% in Phnom-Penh and Mandalay), to 9% in San Francisco, Rome and Christchurch.
ability across cities for each category. As one would
expect, cities are showing different patterns regarding
different categories. However, a close analysis reveals
that on average category availabilities are somewhat
equilibrated around 55% with the following breakdown:
Nightlife Spot (60.96%), Food (58.19%), Professional &
Other Places (55.18%), Shop & Service (54.89%), Med-
ical Center(54.76%), Arts & Entertainment (53.50%),
Residence (49.51%), Outdoors & Recreation (49.36%),
College & University (49.19%), Travel & Transport
(49.00%). This reveals that the most affected category
of services across cities is Travel and Transport that in-
cludes places such as bus and metro stations, airports,
rail stations, etc. In the third and last panel (c) we
report examples of cities with completely different reac-
tions to failures in terms of service providing. London
(UK) as a city that severely suffers the failure by los-
ing access to almost 70% of its services with a particu-
lar emphasis on medical centers and transport; Amman
(Jordan) as a mid affected city losing access to 55% of
its services; and New York (US) – as a good example –
looses only 30% of its services with a high preservation
of its medical centers.
5. DISCUSSION AND PERSPECTIVES
In this work, we have focused on various aspects of
road network robustness. To do so, we have exploited
large, publicly available datasets, and the rich tradi-
tion in percolation theory. Our results indicate that
phase transitions occur at different levels of deteriora-
tion (early vs. late), but also in qualitatively different
manners (abrupt vs. smooth). While these differences
may result from different design principles [14], we sug-
gest that these heterogeneous “percolation profiles” can
be interpreted as a fingerprint of the city, in the sense
that these profiles are unique to each of them –while at
the same time incomplete (a city is much more than its
road structure).
We complement the structural degradation approach
with a reachability perspective, coupling the infrastruc-
tural level with the services it connects. Indeed, a frac-
tured road network is not critical per se, but in relation
to the broken flow of people and resources. The results
show again heterogeneous profiles regarding service al-
location. These insights may be helpful in assessing
strategies for a more balanced distribution of such ser-
vices that guarantee reachability a balanced coverage
even in a stressed infrastructure.
Despite the simplifications that our method entails, a
systematic study of these “robustness fingerprints” may
lead to a classification of cities with regard to their
fragility and service distribution imbalances –along the
lines of Louf & Barthelemy [11], but taking a urban re-
silience angle. Beyond its academic interest, such clas-
sification could lead to the design of common preventive
strategies for cities whose structural features resemble
each other (at least from a percolation and service allo-
cation perspective). Furthermore, it could be enriched
with other critical urban networks (e.g. water supply or
power grid) expanding the scope of the study to multi-
layer percolation [4, 8].
All of the previous falls under an overarching vision,
which is related to the existing gaps between policy ac-
tors and scientific activity: the pipeline between both
extremes is often too narrow –if not inexistent. There
seems to be a general agreement that resilience is a de-
sirable feature in urban settlements –as the world pop-
ulation increasingly flows into cities–, but the concept
becomes fuzzy when it comes to the definition of objec-
tives and strategies. In an attempt to alleviate this, we
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Figure 8: Service availability in the giant connected component at percolation threshold pc. Panel
(a) reports the proportion of available services in different cities sorted from the most affected to the
less affected. Panel (b): in green, cities that keep at least 50% of their services in the GCC for all
categories. In red, cities that lose more than 50% services for at least one category. Panel (C): focus
on three different cities with three different behaviors: London in red, Amman in yellow and New
York in green
have taken a specific angle of resilience (that of 100RC)
and mapped some of their targets onto quantifiable,
concrete measurements. There is a large body of work
waiting ahead before we can come up with an objective
set of methods to measure urban resilience, taking into
account the wide range of temporal and spatial scales a
city encloses.
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